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The successful Brexit referendum and the election of Trump in 2016 mark the
breakthrough of populism in the West. Opposition to immigration has been central
to both events. However, it has been central in different ways. This paper maps these
differences and the implications of both populisms for a liberal immigration policy.
Driven by hostility to free mobility within the EU, the ironic consequence of Brexit
will be an immigration policy that is less discriminatory than previously, in the sense
that favoritism for other Europeans is now ruled out. By contrast, Trump’s
immigration policy is openly and brazenly discriminatory. In particular, its Muslim Ban
breaches the “anti-populist norm” (Freeman 1995) and thus the essence of a liberal
immigration policy.
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Introduction
The 2016 Brexit referendum and the US election victory of Donald Trump will be re-
membered as the breakthrough of populism in the West. Perhaps not by accident, the
two societies that had been the champions of neoliberalism in the early 1980s, and of
the globalization that started at the end of the decade, succumbed to a nationalist
populism that prescribes “closure” against “openness”, the “new political divide” of our
time.1
It is a truism that opposition to immigration has been central to both Brexit and the
rise of Trump, much as it has been central to the entire phenomenon of nationalist
populism whose crest the two events represent. But immigration has been central to
them in different ways. To explore these differences is the purpose of this paper. How
has immigration been processed in both instances of populism, and what are the impli-
cations of both populisms for a liberal immigration policy?
As I shall argue, Brexit, while thriving on a long-held British animus against Europe,
has been fundamentally a backlash against the first ever open and expansive immigra-
tion policy in modern Britain, which had been ventured by New Labour under Tony
Blair. Crucially, New Labour’s immigration policy was expansive throughout the skill
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1“The New Political Divide”, The Economist, 30 July 2016, p.7.
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Joppke Comparative Migration Studies            (2020) 8:49 Page 2 of 18ladder, including low-skilled immigration, which—more than high-skilled immigra-
tion—had always been the fulcrum of populist aversion, not only in Britain.2 For New
Labour’s openness to the low-skilled stands the fateful non-moratorium on Eastern mi-
gration, especially from Poland, after the 2004 EU Enlargement. Because “mass EU im-
migration” figured centrally in the phenomenal rise of the UK Independence Party
(UKIP),3 no singular factor has been more decisive for setting Brexit into motion. How-
ever, as much as Brexit may be looked at as populist reaction to a too expansive immi-
gration policy, in terms of accepting high numbers that were far above the limit of
what was commonly held acceptable, it does not change the quality of a liberal immi-
gration policy. Post-Brexit, the UK will embrace the typical combination of courting
high-skilled while restricting low-skilled immigration, standard throughout the OECD
world, only without any special deal for Europeans (see MAC 2018, 2020). In the sly
rhetoric of some Brexit advocates, like Michael Gove, a post-Brexit immigration policy
will even be less “racist” than pre-Brexit, because it will be more open for non-
Europeans: “(O)utside the European Union we can have a truly colour-blind migration
policy that, if the British people want to, treats people from the Bahamas in the same
way as we treat people from Bulgaria.”4
By contrast, the rise of Trump, to move to the second populist shock of 2016, goes
along with a threat to the fundaments of a liberal immigration policy. This is because
the “anti-populist norm”, according to a classic paper by Gary Freeman (1995) the core
of a liberal immigration policy, has been breached; this norm stipulates the taboo for
elites to address the ethno-racial composition of migrant intakes. Already candidate
Trump had made disparaging remarks about Mexican immigrants as “bad hombres”
and “criminals, drug-dealers, rapists”. Once in office, the most far-reaching and legally
consequential case of breaching the anti-populist norm has been his “Muslim Ban”
(later rebranded “Travel Ban”), which prohibits the entry of citizens from several
Muslim-majority countries into the US. A mellowed version of it has been held consti-
tutional by the US Supreme Court in June 2018. Two constitutional principles come to
a head here: the traditional “plenary power” of the presidency over foreign affairs and
immigration, and the antidiscrimination norm that, since the civil rights era, has put
limits on the federal government’s immigration powers and that is the legal essence of
a liberal immigration policy. The Muslim ban is a test case of how deeply the new na-
tionalist populism can cut into ethnically and racially non-discriminatory immigration
policies, which have become the standard since the 1960s.
To home in on Brexit and Trump is not to deny that radical right parties, the spear-
head of populism in the West, had sought to influence immigration policies for several
decades already. This is documented in a literature that is too vast to be surveyed here.
Importantly, this literature is inconclusive about the actual impact of the radical right
on immigration policy. Cas Mudde found radical right parties “dogs that bark loud, but
hardly ever bite” (2013, p. 14). Writing earlier in the millennium, Tim Bale (2003)2According to a Pew Research survey of 2019, even among those who want less overall immigration, half or
more support more skilled immigration. This pattern can be found in the major countries of Western Europe
(Germany, France, UK, and others), and in the classic immigration countries (US, Canada, Australia) (see
Lind 2020, p. 78, fn.23).
3UKIP leader Nigel Farage, quoted in Ford and Goodwin (2014, p. 91).
4“Michael Gove: Brexit’s not made UK less welcoming to immigrants”, BBC News (https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-43821484).
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migration long before radical right parties were around. Earlier still, Rogers Brubaker
(1995, p. 908), in a rebuttal of Freeman’s (1995) “anti-populist norm”, described Euro-
pean immigration policy as “chronically populist”, even before populism existed as dis-
tinct parties or movements. A study of the manifestos of 68 political parties in 17
European countries between 1980 and 2014 found that mainstream parties, whether
right or left, have increasingly “accommodated” radical right demands, particularly on
their favored “liberal-authoritarian” issues (which includes immigration, minorities, and
law and order) (Wagner and Meyer 2017). On the other hand, an analysis of more than
fifty years of mainstream party manifestos in 12 West European countries, between the
early 1960s and 2013, found that “(o)n dimensions of salience, substance, and stance,
(there is) little evidence that (anti-immigrant parties)”, which after all are everywhere
minority or even niche parties, “dictate or even influence how centrist parties address
the topic (of immigration)” (Dancygier and Margalit 2019, p. 33).
The jury about the influence of the populist right is out. The significance of Brexit and
Trump consists of the fact that a minority force has suddenly acquired majority status,
thus potentially shaping the law of the land, including that on immigration. This justifies
the focus on the “double shock” of 2016. In addition, an in-depth account of the mutual
implication of populism and immigration policy in just two cases allows detecting nuances
and ironies that are often lost in the large-N designs that predominate in the literature.
Brexit
In a famous commentary on British immigration policy, Gary Freeman (1994) had
called Britain “the deviant case”. While all other Western democracies were plagued by
a “gap” between expansionist immigration policy outcomes and restriction-minded
mass publics, the case of Britain proved, on the opposite, that “it is possible to limit un-
wanted immigration” (ibid. 297). Freeman plausibly referred this fact to “the work of a
responsible political elite” that, in a context of strong and responsive parliamentary in-
stitutions, took public concerns about “non-European immigration” serious from the
start (ibid. 300). Two decades later, two sociologists found that “migration and the
European Union’s foundational commitment to the free movement of persons” was
“central to the causes and consequences of Brexit” (Favell and Barbulescu 2018, p. 118).
This constitutes a double puzzle: not only does Britain no longer seem to be a “deviant
case”; in addition, the public anti-immigration animus has moved from non-European
to European migrants.
The first thing to notice is that Britain had never really arrived in Europe. Churchill’s
“(w)ith Europe, but not of it” remains the most positive thing one could say about their re-
lationship (quoted in Evans and Menon 2017, p. 1). All major studies on the
“Europeanization” of national identities noticed the British exception (Fligstein 2008,
Chapter 6; Risse 2010, p. 81). A recent analysis of the Brexit vote even found the low level
of British identification with Europe a “key contributor” to its outcome (Carl et al. 2019,
p. 282). In light of this, UKIP leader Nigel Farage’s polemical neologism of “mass EU immi-
gration” is not as far-fetched as it may appear at first, does it show zero sympathy for other
Europeans. However, it was still regressive because, legally speaking, the free movement of
European Union citizens is not “immigration” but exercise of a citizenship right, in fact, the
EU citizenship right. Reflecting on UKIP’s break-through in the 2013 local elections, Farage
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Euroscepticism”: “It took me bloody years to get immigration and Europe together but I
knew…that it was now the same thing” (in Ford and Goodwin 2014, p. 90).
Britain’s transformation from “zero immigration country” to one that underwent
what Farage called “mass EU immigration” was the unintended consequence of deliber-
ate policy choice under New Labour. This outcome is interesting in at least two re-
spects. First, it shows that European migration could turn out as controversial as non-
European migration. The magnitude of migration may matter just as much as its ethnic
or racial composition. When the Blair government decided, for reasons of good neigh-
borliness but above all in light of acute labor shortages, not to impose a temporary
moratorium on migrants from the new Eastern member states in 2004, in contrast to
most other Western European member states, this was at one level merely the result of
wrong numerical forecasting (see Wright 2012, p. 743). However, what also proved
wrong was the more latent ethno-racial rationale of this choice: the expectation that
other Europeans would cause less opposition than non-Europeans when low-skilled va-
cancies had to be filled for which not enough Britons were available.
Strangely unaddressed in public discourse, until 2015 extra-EU flows, including from
the traditional postcolonial source countries, persistently exceeded the historically un-
precedented intra-EU flows post-2004. This led Eric Kaufmann (2018, p. 182) to the as-
sumption that an “anti-racist norm…deflect(ed) criticism away from Asians and
Africans towards white immigrants from the EU”. However, the overwhelming import-
ance of numbers in the “Second Great Arrival” (Goodhart 2013, Chapter 5) cannot be
overlooked. If the first postcolonial arrival had brought 2 million new people to Britain,
the new-millennium wave added the double amount of 4 million, and this in 15 not 50
years. This “quite literally changed the face of Britain”.5
Next to underestimating the power of numbers, there was a second flaw in the design of
New Labour’s expansive immigration policy. This is the assumption that immigration, if only
properly “managed” as legal labor migration, would take pressure off an overcharged asylum
system and put to rest a vitriolic tabloid campaign against “bogus” asylum-seekers that was
gearing up in the late 1990s. Randall Hansen (2014, p. 208) sarcastically referred to this think-
ing as “a theory that was being passed around seminar rooms at the time”, namely that
“expanding unskilled immigration would take pressure off the asylum queues”. The problem
with this “theory” is twofold. First, the “massive disparities in wealth” between sending and re-
ceiving countries make it unlikely that any “opening of unskilled migration channels” could
ever be sufficient to meet demand (Hansen 2014, pp. 208–9). Secondly, as a summary account
of immigration policy under Blair put it, “the public did not, as the government had antici-
pated, readily tell the difference between an asylum-seeker, a migrant worker or an internal
student in their neighbourhood” (Spencer 2007, p. 349).
Right after entering office in 1997, Blair’s New Labour countered a historical peak of
asylum requests with one of Europe’s most restrictive refugee policies, which included
carrier sanctions, the limitation of appeal rights, forced detention and dispersal, and re-
placing cash benefits with vouchers. This was on the assumption that economic migrants
should be deterred from using the asylum route. However, while the number of new asy-
lum claimants fell, from 103.000 in the peak year 2002 to 23.500 in 2006, the “tabloids5Finch and Goodhart quoted in Consterdine (2015, p. 1434).
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348f). Because asylum reform required primary legislation, which arrived in three laws
passed in 1999, 2002, and 2004, there was a “consistently high profile” to the topic that
fueled “contentious and divisive political debate” (ibid. 348). And even if the government
excelled in “tough rhetoric”, this only had the effect of “wind(ing) up” public concerns in-
stead of “reassure(ing) them”, as one observer commented (in ibid. 349).
Parallel to being hyper-restrictive on asylum, New Labour opened up in a big way for
economic migration. This was not only to take pressure off the asylum system, accord-
ing to the mentioned “seminar-room theory”, but it was an entirely new approach to
immigration, from the “control” to the “management” of migration in the country’s
economic interest (see Balch 2009, p. 617). Part of a larger “Cool Britannia” campaign
that married a multicultural diversity agenda with economic neoliberalism, the attempt
was to “rub the Right’s nose in diversity and render their arguments out of date”.6
Labour leader Ed Miliband later confessed that this was an error: “We were dazzled by
globalization and too sanguine about its price.”7
Crucially, New Labour’s immigration policy included not only the foray, found every-
where in the OECD world, into high-skilled and student migration, but also the expansion
of low-skilled migration, the most fateful element of which was unhindered access to Brit-
ain for the citizens of the A8 countries joining the EU in 2004.8 This had to spell trouble.
In 2009, when “immigration” already ranked as one of the top three concerns facing the
country, a survey found that almost 60% of the public “strongly” or “somewhat supported”
reducing the number of unskilled migrant workers (Ford et al. 2015, p. 1398). Public fears
in this respect were not entirely unfounded. In the lowly-regulated and flexible British
labor market, the impact of new millennium migration on salary levels, while overall neg-
ligible, was still felt in the lowest wage segment (see Manow 2018, p. 128). Accordingly,
the Leave vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum was “systematically higher” in the industrial
Midlands, where wages are low and unemployment is high (ibid. 129).
Continuously rising net migration, with an all-time peak of 336.000 exactly in the 12
months preceding June 2016, was an entirely new phenomenon in the UK. Even in the heyday
of postcolonial immigration in the 1960s, net migration had been small or even negative be-
cause of high levels of British out-migration. Steeply increased net migration since the late
1990s, when New Labour came to power, went along with “immigration” becoming one of
the top concerns facing the country in the eyes of the British public. Whereas in 1997 only 3
% had listed immigration and race as among the top-three concerns, in 2002, at the height of
a (relatively) large asylum inflow, the figure was up to 39%; and in 2006, two years into the
Eastern European inflow, 40% of the public deemed immigration the most important single
issue facing Britain (Spencer 2007, pp. 341 and 348). By late 2015, when net migration reached
its record level, a whopping 63% of Britons ranked immigration as the most pressing issue of
the day, way ahead of healthcare (39%) and the economy (33%) (Clarke et al. 2017, p. 11).
Late New Labour tried to stem the tide with a new emphasis on “controlling our bor-
ders” (Home Office 2005), and a new points-based system, modelled on Australia, was6A former advisor and speechwriter of Tony Blair, quoted in Kaufmann (2018, p. 150).
7Quoted in “UK Immigration”, Financial Times, 25 June 2012, p.8.
8A8 workers were merely asked to register under the Accession State Worker Registration Scheme, which
was in place between 2004 and 2011 to keep track of the labor market effects. While registration was
mandatory, failing to do so was not prosecuted.
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Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, the mistake of 2004 was not repeated and
free movement from these countries remained restricted during their first 7 years of
membership. And Blair’s intra-party successor, Gordon Brown, speaking to the Trade
Union Congress (TUC) in 2007, promised the creation of 500.000 “British jobs for Brit-
ish workers” (Smith 2008, p. 425).
However, by that time immigration had long become a “wedge issue” (Hansen 2014, p.
200) busily exploited by the Conservative Party in opposition. Initially, this was with little
success. In sync with the right-wing tabloid hysteria, the 2001 and 2005 Tory election
campaigns were “populist” on immigration and asylum, depicting Labour as “hopelessly
out of touch” with the people (Bale et al. 2011, p. 398). But this was to no effect. Labour
easily won both elections, and Tony Blair could sneer, in 2005, that “The Tory Party have
gone from being a One Nation Party to being a one-issue-party” (Hansen 2014, p. 210).
The page turned when David Cameron took over the Conservative leadership in late
2005, intent on remedying the Tories’ “nasty party” image with a more moderate if, in
essence, still populist line on immigration. On the moderate side, he committed himself
to a “multiracial Britain” that he deemed “a success”, with immigration set to “con-
tinue”, yet in a “controlled” manner (Bale et al. 2011, p. 404). Anticipating the winds of
Brexit, Cameron deemed the immigration problem more one of “levels” than of “differ-
ent colours”, in particular, one of crowded “services”: “It’s the pressure on schools, pres-
sure on hospitals, pressure on housing” (ibid. 401). Perfectly in line with this diagnosis,
the 2010 Conservative Manifesto promised to “take steps to take net migration back to
the levels of the1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands”. This was
to be achieved within just one parliamentary period, that is, by 2015 (ibid. 399).
But this was not moderate at all. After Blair’s liberal wager that large-scale but “man-
aged” migration would be publically acceptable, Cameron’s volte-face was the second fate-
ful political choice that prepared the road toward Brexit. While the Tories’ exploitation of
public concerns about large-scale migration “clearly contributed” to Labour’s “heavy de-
feat” in the 2010 election (Bale 2014, p. 296), the “tens of thousands” pledge was impos-
sible to meet. With a net migration figure of ca. 250.000 at the time, not only the high EU
component but also constitutional commitments to non-EU asylum and family migration
stood in the way. Because non-EU low-skilled migration had already been closed down
under late New Labour, Cameron, with his Home Minister, Theresa May, had to go
against high-skilled and student migration to fulfill the Tories’ impossible pledge, even
though these migrations were not publically opposed and controversial at all. A second
offshoot of the “tens of thousands” campaign was the infamous order by May’s Home Of-
fice to create a “hostile environment” for illegal migrants. This enlisted teachers, doctors,
employers, and landlords in sniffing-up these migrants, and shamefully erroneous expul-
sion notices were issued to postcolonial-generation migrants, who had been long settled
in the UK, but who had never been officially furnished with legal residence papers.10
Despite a whirlwind of restrictive, even draconian measures, the “tens of thousands”
pledge could not remotely be achieved. After a temporary lull, from 2013 on the net
migration figures even reached new heights, crossing the 300.000 mark in 2014. This9Immigration Minister Liam Bryne, quoted in Smith (2008, p. 425).
10Jessica Elgot, “Theresa May’s `Hostile Environment` at the Heart of Windrush Scandal”, The Guardian, 17
April 2018.
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European Debt Crisis migration from southern member states, particularly Spain; and,
secondly, the end of the seven-year moratorium on Romanian and Bulgarian free move-
ment after these two countries had joined the EU in 2007. With their “tens of thou-
sands” pledge, the Conservatives had inadvertently produced their own wedge issue,
whetting the appetite for a drastic reduction of immigration that was picked up by the
ferociously anti-EU and anti-immigration tabloids and, of course, by the populist UK
Independence Party. Overall, Britain’s immigration policy under the Conservative Cam-
eron government must be considered a paradigmatic case of an immigration policy dic-
tated by hostile public opinion, which in the UK was even stronger opposed to
immigration than in “any other large European country”.11
The third political choice laying the tracks for Brexit was David Cameron’s 2015 elec-
tion pledge to hold a referendum over Britain’s EU membership. This was a Faustian bar-
gain to silence the Eurosceptics in his party; they should “stop banging on about
Europe”.12 Cameron hoped to silence them with pre-referendum concessions from the
EU, most notably about migration. As is well known, “Dave’s deal” flopped (Evans and
Menon 2017, pp. 47–51). Instead of a stop of childcare allowance for families abroad, he
only got a cost-of-living-adjustment possibility; more crucially, instead of a categorical four-
year exclusion of EU foreigners from welfare, he only got a temporary “alert and safeguard”
mechanism in cases of inflows of “exceptional magnitude”; and to add insult to injury, the
“emergency brake” could only be triggered by the European Commission (Dennison and Ged-
des 2018, p. 1146). The possibility to control intra-European flows, the central issue of the
Leave campaign, wasn’t even put on the agenda. “It Stinks”, wrote the Sun, “The Great Delu-
sion” was the headline in the Daily Mirror, and 54% of the surveyed British public felt the
concessions would “make no real difference” (Clarke et al. 2017, p. 26).
Accordingly, Cameron’s pro-EU campaign fell silent on the migration and the closely
related national sovereignty issues. Instead, it evolved as “Project Fear”, according to
which “leaving Europe would threaten our economic and our national security” (Cam-
eron in Clarke et al. 2017, p. 30). This instrumental focus perfectly mirrored that even
among eventual Remain voters “strong attachment to the EU” figured as the least im-
portant of four suggested reasons for their choice (the most important being risks con-
nected to “economy, jobs and prices”) (Carl et al. 2019, p. 289). However, it dodged the
central concerns of the small majority of 51.9% of British voters who eventually voted
for “Leave” in June 2016. When asked about their motivation, 68% of them said they did
so out of a concern about migration. This was second only to the 74% whose first motive
was sovereignty (Wöhst 2018, p. 25), dubbed “Take Back Control” in the UKIP-led “Lea-
ve.eu” branch of the Leave campaign.13 So strong was the anti-immigration impulse of
Leave-voters, that 35% of them claimed to be prepared to accept a 5% reduction of their
income if only EU migration was reduced to zero (Kaufmann 2018, p. 201).
Perhaps the strongest and ultimately decisive image in this most dramatic episode of
modern British history is the ignominious “Breaking-Point” poster of the Leave.eu11"The Tories` Barmiest", The Economist, 20 October 2012, p.14.
12David Cameron, quoted in Dennison and Geddes (2018, p. 1143).
13The official leave campaign was “Vote Leave”, which focused more on sovereignty and free trade deals with
emergent countries. One of its most prominent figures, Boris Johnson, described himself as “passionately
pro-immigration and pro-immigrant” (quoted in Kaufmann 2018, p. 194).
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refugee crisis that raged in Continental Europe, the poster shows hordes of dark-
skinned asylum seekers in Slovenia heading toward the Austrian border: “We must
break free of the EU and take back control of our borders”, can be read at the bottom.
This was populism, pure and simple, spreading false information and demagogic. To re-
member, the UK government had opted out of all inconvenient provisions under EU
immigration law, was not part of the Schengen Area, and in principle could send back
any asylum-seeker to her first EU country under the Dublin Convention of which the
UK was a member. Brexit, in reality, would reduce the possibility of the UK government
to control the entry and stay of certain third-country nationals, most notably asylum-
seekers. This is because, at a minimum, “Dublin” will not be “for free any longer”, as
Daniel Thym pointed out (2017, p. 2).
The typical Leave voter had no academic degree (78%), was dependent on social
housing (70%), had an income below 1200 Pounds monthly (66%), and was over 65
years old (61%) (Wöhst 2018, p. 25). These were not the winners of Britain’s neoliberal-
ism that had started with Thatcher and that was driven to new heights under Blair--
“Thatcher in trousers”, as Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm dismissively called the lat-
ter. Cameron’s successor, Tory Prime Minister Theresa May, and after her Boris
Johnson, stubbornly vowed to deliver the Brexit that Leave voters wanted. “To get
Brexit done”, was Boris Johnson’s mantra-like promise at the historical December 2019
elections, which he won by large margins. He delivered on his promise within 2
months, the UK officially leaving the EU on 1 February 2020.
It is sometimes overlooked that, in ideological terms, Johnson took a page from his luckless
predecessor, Theresa May, who was weirdly globalist and populist in tandem. Already May
had packaged Brexit as a quest for a truly “Global Britain”, while simultaneously acting on be-
half of the “people down the road” who were loathing “the international elites”. Here is May’s
famous line at the 2016 Conservative Party Congress in Birmingham, which could have been
written by David Goodhart: “But if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you are a citizen
of nowhere—you don’t understand what citizenship means”.14
With respect to immigration’s role in Brexit, the experience of massive and sudden mi-
gration after 2004, particularly in economically depressed areas that had not seen it before,
strongly correlated with a preference for Brexit. Consider Boston, a small town of 35.000
in the East Midlands, with vegetable and potato fields that are worked by farm hands from
Poland. 75.6% of Bostonians voted for Brexit in June 2016, which was the highest score in
the UK. Boston had seen its migrant population grow sixteen-fold between 2005 and
2015, from 1000 to 16.000 (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017, pp. 454–5; Wöhst 2018, p. 31).
These may be small numbers, but their exponential increase is remarkable. After the vote,
journalists from all over the world fell into this hapless place to explore the secrets of
Brexit. They found a place distressed by low wages and high living costs, strained public
services and scarce housing, with much talk about recently increased crime rates. And
they found a place with extreme ethnic segregation, the Poles shopping in their own su-
permarkets and hanging out in their own pubs. A few days after the referendum, a Polish-14For the full text of her speech, see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-
speech-in-full/.
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note on his car’s windshield: “Did you pack your bags yet?”15
A much less known but highly interesting element in the demography of the Brexit referen-
dum is the Asian vote. Some districts with South Asian populations exceeding 25% delivered
solid Leave votes, including Bradford, Slouth, or Luton. This outcome might be explained by
the usual socio-economic variables. But some places in West London, where the level of edu-
cation and prosperity would lead one to expect Remain votes, but which have a “noticeable
South Asian presence”, still voted Leave (Ehsan 2017). This dynamic is as yet unexplored.
However, why should prosperous ethnics of Indian, Pakistani, or Bengali background feel and
vote pro-European? They had been taught to adopt “British values”, and some of their intel-
lectuals, like Tariq Modood or Bhikhu Parekh, have praised British multiculturalism in dis-
tinctly nationalist terms. As their circuit spanned Britain and South Asia, but not the
European continent, what should the provincial project of taking from European borders
“their rigidity and…intransigent hostility”, as the European Saint Robert Schuman had envi-
sioned (in Geddes 2014, p. 290), mean to them? Some Leave campaigners shrewdly courted
the Asian minorities by denouncing a “racist” immigration system that allowed white EU mi-
grants to enter the UK freely, while those from the Indian subcontinent were subjected to visa
and work restrictions (see Ehsan 2017).
Striking exactly this chord, the UK’s “future skill-based immigration system”, first
presented in December 2018 and in essence adopted in early 2020, wants to be “a sys-
tem where it is workers’ skills that matter, not which country they come from”.16 In the
assumption that only after leaving the European Union a truly non-discriminatory im-
migration policy is possible,17 the primal non-participation of Britain in the European
project comes full circle. The post-Brexit immigration policy will naturally court high-
skilled immigrants, while discarding “an explicit work migration route for low-skilled
workers” (MAC 2018, p. 5). While this caused some stir when officially announced in
February 2020,18 it only aligns Britain with the two-pronged immigration policy that is
now standard across rich OECD societies.
Not accidentally, the notion of a “Australian-style points based immigration system”19 was
spread with great fanfare by Boris Johnson, who had been curiously pro-migration throughout
the entire Brexit campaign (and, of course, prior to that, during his time as Mayor of London).
However, this was not the novelty as which Johnson presented it. In reality, a points-based
system had been in place since 2008. Only, over time it had devolved from a system of “trade-
able points” into one where successful applicants had to “meet all criteria”, most importantly,
skills and a job with a minimum salary at hand. This had made the points that were still for-
mally attached to these criteria, well, pointless (MAC 2020, p. 1). In January 2020, the Migra-
tion Advisory Council recommended to retain this system, with or without points, which it
deemed merely a question of “cosmetics” (ibid. 6).15Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “After ‘Brexit’ Vote, Immigrants Feel a Town Turn Against Them”, New York
Times, 9 July 2016.
16From the foreword by Prime Minister Theresa May (Home Office 2018, p. 3).
17Of course, this non-discrimination talk is little more than a ploy. For the many indirect ways in which for-
mally non-discriminatory immigration policies may still be discriminatory, see Ellermann and Goenaga
(2019).
18Larry Elliott, “The New UK Immigration Rules Tell Employers to Suck it up”, The Guardian, 18 February
2020.
19Heather Stewart et al., “Conservative Party Manifesto”, The Guardian, 25 November 2019.
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making. Except that due to the end of free movement for Europeans, this policy will
have to be more expansive than in the past to meet the UK’s economic needs. Tellingly,
the poisonous “tens of thousands” pledge, which helped catapult the UK out of the EU,
has in the meantime been quietly dropped.Trump
The best barometer of a liberal immigration policy is what Gary Freeman (1995, p.
894) has called the “anti-populist norm”. It prescribes “constrained” discourse over im-
migration, in particular, precluding “argument over the ethnic composition of migrant
streams”. The Brexit campaign, which was more about the quantity than the quality of
recent (EU) migration to Britain, largely observed the anti-populist norm, and it even
made a less “discriminatory” immigration policy one of its selling-points. By contrast,
the rise of Trump has implied the complete demolition of the anti-populist norm. The
“exploit(ation) (of) racial, ethnic, or immigration-related fears in order to win votes”,
which according to Freeman is verboten (ibid. 886), figured centrally in Trump’s 2016
election campaign, with Mexicans as “bad hombres” and an “Islam (that) hates us”.
Does this herald the return to a racially discriminatory immigration policy that Western
states had abandoned over half a century ago?
The most serious test case is the “Muslim Ban”, later sanitized as “Travel Ban”. On
his campaign trail, Trump had infamously promised a “total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States”. Upon signing Executive Order No. 13769 (hence-
forth EO-1), one of his very first acts after assuming office in late January 2017, Trump
read its title aloud: “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States”, then looked up and said “We all know what that means”.20 What “that means”
is the swift fulfillment of one of his most controversial and inflammatory election
promises. This was also one of the most chaotic episodes in a presidency that has not
been short of them. EO-1, with immediate effect, barred from entry into the US all citi-
zens of seven Muslim-majority countries, even if they were visa holders or legal per-
manent residents returning from a visit abroad. Because Trump and his advisors had
not consulted with government lawyers beforehand and not applied the usual intra-
executive legal process, the result was “chaos in American airports”.21 Over 700 trav-
elers were detained or put back on the next return flight, and about 60.000 visa were
“provisionally revoked”. The courts that immediately stalled the order, took the absence
of ordinary legal process itself as “evidence of a discriminatory motive” (Eggleston and
Elbogen 2018, p. 835). When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which like
all other government agencies had not been consulted, arrived to the legal conclusion
that legal permanent residents had to be excluded from the order, this was immediately
overruled by Trump’s “inner circle”, Stephen Miller and Steven Bannon; they decreed
that green card holders could be admitted only on a “case by case basis”.22 In this re-
markable moment, the rule of law was quite literally lifted in favor of the rule of popu-
lists, and of known white supremacists at that.20Quoted in US Supreme Court, Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S.__(2018), Justice Sotomayor dissenting, at p.7.
21“Chaos at Airports as America Introduces Travel Ban”, The Economist, 30 January 2017.
22Evan Perez et al., “Inside the Confusion of the Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban”, CNN, 30 January
2017.
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ban (EO-2), issued in March 2017, applied only to those who lacked a valid visa at the
order’s effective date and it did not include legal permanent residents; in addition, Iraq
was removed from the list of excluded countries because of its “close cooperative rela-
tionship” with the US. Like its predecessor, EO-2 was immediately blocked in court, on
statutory and constitutional grounds. However, in June 2017 the Supreme Court, which
accepted to review the case, temporarily lifted the lower court injunctions, except for
those who held a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship” with a person or entity in
the United States. Accordingly, the government had a relatively free-go as long as
America’s highest court had not made up its mind. In September 2017, a “Proclam-
ation” (EO-3) replaced EO-2, which had been meant to be valid for 90 days only. Sudan
was dropped from the list of excluded countries, while Chad, North Korea, and
Venezuela were added to the original core of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.
Including two non-Muslim countries was an obvious move to rebut the charge of
“anti-Muslim animus” that lower courts had brought to justify their injunctions. Simi-
larly, a tailored approach of excluding only certain but not all entry possibilities for the
citizens of the prohibited countries, apparently strengthened the government claim that
not religious animus but “national security” was the driving concern. In December
2017, the Supreme Court upheld also this third and latest version of the Travel Ban
pending its final decision, but this time in full.
Before the courts, the government made three arguments in defense of the Travel
Ban, which are in the order of a logical progression (see Cole 2018). First, and most
fundamentally, courts were not competent to review in the first, as it was in the sover-
eign power of the political branches of government to decide about matters related to
immigration and foreign affairs. Since it was first formulated in the late nineteenth cen-
tury Chinese Exclusion Case, this was known as the “plenary power” doctrine. As Just-
ice Fields had argued in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, the “highest duty of every
nation” resided in efforts to “preserve its independence, and give security against for-
eign aggression and encroachment”, and courts were not allowed to impair the federal
government in this task (quoted in Margulies 2018, p. 27). This was no American idio-
syncrasy. Already Emer de Vattel, the Swiss eighteenth century inventor of inter-
national law, had considered the control of immigration as a “logical corollary” to
“rights of domain and sovereignty” (quoted in ibid.). In the meantime, however, human
rights and non-discrimination have advanced as co-constitutive principles of political
order, next to sovereignty. To a degree, even the US Supreme Court acknowledged
them as constraining the “plenary” immigration power of the government.23 As the
Travel Ban made its way through the courts, this was to become a test case whether
the retreat of plenary power would continue or be halted.
Secondly, the government argued that, even if courts did review what it deemed unre-
viewable, the external statements of the President, from which the plaintiffs had plausibly
deduced that religious animus undergirded the Travel Ban, did not count. Only the text
of the Proclamation (EO-3) should count, which “says nothing about religion.”2423Zadydas v. Davis (533 US 678 [2001]).
24Trump v. Hawaii, syllabus at p.5.
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vetting review by the Department of Homeland Security under EO-2, which merely
identified countries that did not sufficiently cooperate in providing security-relevant in-
formation about their nationals or that themselves were suspected to be “a state spon-
sor of terrorism”, had sufficiently neutralized or “laundered” any impermissible intent
on part of the President (Cole 2018, p. 4).
Stunningly, in its final decision, Trump v. Hawaii (2018), the Supreme Court followed
the government argumentation almost in full. It thus did its share to “normalize[] the
Trump presidency”, as Peter Spiro (2019, p. 113) appositely argues. In coming to its
conclusion, the court had to rebut two claims made by plaintiffs and which had previ-
ously been accepted by lower courts: that the President had acted outside of his statu-
tory authority as granted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and that his
action was in violation of the constitutional Establishment Clause that prohibits reli-
gious discrimination.
With respect to the statutory question, §1182(f) of INA grants the President authority,
“for such period as he shall deem necessary”, to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any
class of aliens” if he deems their entry “detrimental to the interests of the United States”.
The question is whether this authority is only “interstitial” and limited to crisis situations,
as argued by the plaintiffs and held by lower courts; or whether it is “permanent” and gen-
eral, as implied in the Travel Ban and as eventually upheld by the Supreme Court. Cer-
tainly, “(b)y its plain language”, this clause “grants the President broad discretion to
suspend the entry of aliens into the United States”, as the Supreme Court majority
defended its more sweeping interpretation of the scope of the clause. However, never be-
fore had a government pushed this line; all previous invocations of §1182(f) had been of
the “interstitial” kind. One example is when President Reagan temporarily banned the
entry of “all Cuban nationals” in retaliation for the Mariel Boat Lift, in which Castro had
flooded the US with Cuba’s near-total prison population. A second “interstitial” example
is when President Carter barred Iranians from entering the US during the Iranian Hostage
Crisis. The problem is that, thirteen years after 9/11, fifteen of whose 19 attackers notably
hailed from a Saudi Arabia that President Trump at no point had considered to include in
his “Travel Ban”, there plainly was no crisis situation to justify not merely the temporary
exclusion of a tiny island population, like the Cubans, but of some 150 million people
worldwide, and possibly in permanence.
A second statutory issue to resolve was whether the Travel Ban entailed a violation of
the non-discrimination clause under INA, §1152(a)(1)(A), which stipulates that “no per-
son shall…be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” Apparently, the
Travel Ban categorically excluded on the basis of nationality, so that it constituted dis-
crimination under the clause. At least, so argued the plaintiffs and lower courts. To
counter this objection, the Supreme Court majority made a distinction between “admis-
sibility determinations” and “visa issuance”, arguing that the non-discrimination clause
applied only to the latter, but not the former. Therefore, it couldn’t be a constraint on
the government’s authority to exclude entire “class(es) of aliens” under §1182(f). The
federal court that was overruled in this decision begged to disagree. It followed the
plaintiffs’ argument that the broad authority delegated to the government under INA
could not be allowed to become a “wrecking ball” against an immigration statute that,
Joppke Comparative Migration Studies            (2020) 8:49 Page 13 of 18from the mid-1960s on, had solemnly abdicated the racially motivated national-origin
quota system of the past. Indeed, EO-3 “ominously echoes the national origin quotas
that Congress rejected in 1965” (Margulies 2017).
However, the main question before the court was not statutory but constitutional:
did the “Travel Ban”, which by Trump’s own admission was a “morphed”25 version of
the “Muslim Ban” that he had promised in his campaign, inhere the “unconstitutional
purpose of excluding Muslims”?26 It is at first puzzling that the religious discrimination
charge was made under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and not its Free
Exercise Clause, because the focus of the former is on “institutions” but not “individ-
uals” (Maltz 2018, p. 407).27 However, if the “clearest command” of the Establishment
Clause is that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an-
other”,28 the religious discrimination charge could be made through the institutional
angle also. In fact, by this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, Trump had vio-
lated it in all openness. This is because the first version of the Travel Ban also included
a 120-day ban on all refugee acceptance, after which period “religious minorities” were
to be preferred. To allow no doubt about the true meaning of this neutral formulation,
on the day of signing the ban Trump explained that it entailed a preference for “Chris-
tian” refugees in Muslim-majority states. But “(t)his is analogous to declaring the
United States a Christian country”, as Noah Feldman exclaimed.29
The religious discrimination charge fed exclusively on external statements by Trump,
made in the course of his campaign and even later in office. These statements were un-
equivocal. The infamous “total and complete (Muslim) shutdown” statement had
remained on his campaign website until May 2017, five months after the issuance of
the first “Travel Ban”. Still on his campaign trail, when asked whether his new insist-
ence on “extreme vetting” meant “pulling back” from the “Muslim Ban”, Trump
responded: “I actually don’t think is (sic) a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an expan-
sion…people were so upset when (I) used the word Muslim.”30 Freshly elected, when
asked whether he would “rethink” his plans to “ban Muslim immigration”, the response
was: “You know my plans. All along. I’ve proven to be right”.31 Having signed the sec-
ond version of the Travel Ban in March 2017, for anyone who would not have noticed,
Trump established the direct link to his “campaign promises”: “I keep my campaign
promises, and our citizens will be very happy when they see the result”32 --though he
himself wasn’t happy about a “watered down, politically correct version” of the “original
Travel Ban.”33 Trump’s frustration about hiding his real intent behind neutral language
and about having to make other compromises did not diminish when the final “Proc-
lamation” was issued in September 2017: “The travel ban into the United States should25Trump v. Hawaii, dissent by Justice Sotomayor, at p.6 (quoting Trump).
26Trump v. Hawaii, majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, at p.24.
27Harvard constitutional lawyer Noah Feldman, in one of the first critical responses to the first version of the
Travel Ban in January 2017, held it to be “violating both the equal protection and free exercise clauses” (N.
Feldman, “Trump’s Travel Ban is an Attack on Religious Liberty”, Bloomberg, 30 January 2017).
28Trump v. Hawaii, majority opinion, at p.26.
29“Trump’s Travel Ban is an Attack on Religious Liberty”, op. cit.
30Trump v. Hawaii, dissent by Justice Sotomayor, at p.6 (quoting Trump).
31Ibid.
32Ibid., p.8 (quoting Trump)
33Ibid., p.9 (quoting Trump).
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rect.”34 The original hint to move from “Muslims” to “territory” obviously had come
from his close advisor Rudolph Giuliani, former mayor of New York, who boasted on
Fox News: “He (Trump) called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show the
right way to do it legally’.” Giuliani’s apparent advice was to “(focus) on, instead of reli-
gion, danger…(The order) is based on places.”35
These external statements were meticulously laid out not only in the dissent by
Justice Sotomayor, but in the Trump-favoring majority opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts. If there ever had been a case of “religious gerrymander”,36 here was one.
The question was how much or how little these statements should count, or, in
legal language, what standard of review should be applied by the court. The usual
standard in Establishment Clause cases is that of the “reasonable observer”. It
was duly taken by dissenting Justice Sotomayor, who concluded on its basis “that
the President was motivated by anti-Muslim animus.”37 Chief Justice Roberts, by
contrast, applied a more lenient “rational basis review” standard, which “considers
whether the entry policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective
to protect the country and improve vetting processes.”38 As the Chief Justice con-
ceded, on this mild review standard “the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy
as illegitimate”.39 While there had been no jurisprudential precedence for this
choice, Roberts deemed “rational review” the right standard simply because one
dealt with an instance of “immigration policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military
actions”.40 In other words, the plenary power doctrine trumped all other consid-
erations, including a discrimination charge under the Establishment Clause.
Once the choice for the “rational basis” test had been made, all that the court
majority needed to find to uphold the policy in question was a “justification inde-
pendent of unconstitutional grounds”.41 They found it in the “national security
concerns” proffered by the government.42 But not without lashing out against the
“religious gerrymander” charge: the policy “covers just 8 percent of the world’s
Muslim population.”43 The same reality, of course, looked different if differently
formulated: the Travel Ban denied entry to 150 million people from six countries
that were to over 90% Muslim. To bolster the government’s “national security”
rationale, the court correctly pointed out that even for the covered countries
there were “significant exceptions” for “various categories” of foreign nationals—
for instance, students and exchange visitors from Iran, America’s enemy No.1,
were allowed in; and there was a waiver program for all foreign nationals cov-
ered, so that each individual, in principle, could make her bid for entry.4434Ibid.
35Trump v. Hawaii, majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, at p.27, quoting “one of the President’s
campaign advisers”, who was Giuliani.
36This was the plaintiff charge, quoted in ibid., at p.26.
37Trump v. Hawaii, dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor, at p.1.
38Trump v. Hawaii, majority opinion by Justice Roberts, at p.32.
39Ibid., at p.33.
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Some of the exempted categories were known to constitute higher risk factors than
others that were included in the ban. In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer laid out
that the “elaborate system of exemptions and waivers” were not “applied” as they
were “written”; thereby “the claim that the Proclamation is a ‘Muslim ban’, rather
than a ‘security-based’ ban, becomes much stronger.”45 For example, the number of
individual waivers was miniscule, and this by explicit order—in the final Proclama-
tion’s first month, there were only 2 waivers out of 6555 eligible applications.46
Moreover, two internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memos, written
just before the issuance of the second version of the Travel Ban in March 2017,
pointed out that citizens of the excluded countries were “rarely implicated in US-
based terrorism” (under 15%), and that “citizenship” in general was “no good indi-
cator of terror threats”; most foreign US-based extremists “radicalized several years
after their entry to the United States”.47
The majority court might counter that it was not up to judges to adjudicate on
the wisdom of policy—“We express no view on the soundness of the policy”, Chief
Justice Roberts blithely stated.48 However, from the ultimate chaos of its first
enunciation on, the Travel Ban has all the appearance of a hastily assembled pack-
age that serves a different, essentially polemical purpose. It epitomizes Trump’s en-
tire immigration policy, which is not geared to serve any substantive purpose, but
to rally nativism, campaign-style. Among those who shared the majority opinion in
Trump v. Hawaii, alone Justice Anthony Kennedy, the long-time “swing vote” who medi-
ated between the conservative and liberal camps on the Supreme Court, uttered an ob-
lique word of critique. Even if “Government officials” are not always “subject to judicial
scrutiny or intervention”, as they apparently were almost not in this case that resurrected
the plenary power doctrine, “(t)hat does not mean those officials are free to disregard the
Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects”.49 Furthermore, “(a)n anxious world
must know that our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitu-
tion seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts”.50 This
was the last sentence in the last opinion of Justice Kennedy, who has since retired from
the Supreme Court. He was replaced by an unambiguously Trump-servile justice who has
cemented the conservative majority in America’s highest court for decades to come.
Trump v. Hawaii ended in a “near-complete legal victory for the Trump administration”
(Spiro 2019, p. 112), and a since recomposed Supreme Court, with the strongest conserva-
tive majority since earlier in the twentieth century, is unlikely to get into its way in the
future.5145Trump v. Hawaii, dissent by Justice Breyer, at p.3.
46Ibid., at p.4.
47The DHS memos are quoted by Cole (2017, p. 6).
48Trump v. Hawaii, majority opinion by Justice Roberts, at p.38.
49Trump v. Hawaii, concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, at p.1.
50Ibid., p.2.
51However, under a newly centrist chief justice Roberts, who has taken on the mediating role that had
previously been played by Kennedy, the Supreme Court has recently issued surprisingly liberal decisions on
LGBT rights and abortion. This may be interpreted as “preserving the court’s independence” (“Hail to the
Chief”, The Economist, 4 July 2020, p.34).
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Of our two cases of immigration in the populist crucible, the story of Brexit
demonstrated that, if the size of the inflow exceeds the level of what is deemed
acceptable, resentment may be directed against migrants from nearby just as eas-
ily as against migrants from afar. Brexit, however, while of dramatic import for
Britain and Europe, does little to change the structure of immigration policy in a
neoliberal age, nor does it challenge its persistent liberal basis—except that it
may make the policy more universalistic, if one holds a negative view on prefer-
ential treatment for other Europeans. As we argued, the Brexit referendum was
“largely, if not entirely, about reducing immigration” (Evans and Menon 2017, p.
121). However, one should not ignore that it was also a classically populist revolt,
on populism’s “vertical” anti-elite rather than its “horizontal” anti-immigrant axis
(for this distinction, see Brubaker 2017). In the first British referendum about EU
membership, in 1975, the electorate “took the advice of people they were used to
following”, as Roy Jenkins put it memorably (Evans and Menon 2017, p. 71). By
contrast, this time around the elite advice to vote for Europe may have turned
the electorate against Europe even more. A most striking facet of the 2016 refer-
endum vote is that three-quarters of who favor the death penalty, which is en-
tirely taboo at the British-cum-European elite and institutional levels, also voted
for leaving the EU (ibid. 74). This suggests that the vote expressed a larger disaffection
of ordinary people with a political elite that is united across party lines by a “socially lib-
eral, pro-market consensus” (ibid. 122), the all-party “party of Davos”.52 Having ruled Brit-
ain for the past 40 years, the party of Davos was thrown out with Brexit. For how long
remains to be seen.
By contrast, Trump’s immigration policy is the most openly populist and discrimin-
atory that can be found anywhere in the Western world. But it also demonstrates how
much leverage for it exists within the given statutory framework. Remarkably, not a sin-
gle legislative change was required to make it possible. It could even build on founda-
tions, particularly in its enforcement bent (that could not be discussed here), which had
been laid by previous Democratic governments, from Clinton to Obama (see Waldinger
2018). The “Muslim” or “Travel Ban” is still the most problematic of all populist inter-
ventions in a Western state’s immigration policy to date. However, it passed constitu-
tional muster only by denying its racially or religiously discriminatory intention, which
means that its formal prohibition is still in force. The most conservative Supreme Court
in living memory was required to come to this result, including a breathtaking level of
ignoring the obvious on its part. Yet, to repeat the essential point, it was a facially neu-
tral “Travel Ban”, no directly discriminatory “Muslim Ban”, that came to be licensed by
the court. Accordingly, it does not mark a return to the openly racist immigration pol-
icy of the pre-1960s period. It is also noteworthy that pluralist American institutions,
from recalcitrant federal courts to “sanctuary” cities and states, to the Democratic op-
position in Congress to the most symbolically loaded and ludicrous of Trump’s pro-
jects, the building of his “Big, Beautiful Wall” at the US-Mexican border, have so far
held the line against a populist Durchmarsch.52“The Party of Davos”, The Economist, 16 November 2019, p.30.
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